group, or their practices, in a way which fails to mirror current state policy on equality and nondiscrimination. Particular religious practices are condemned by the Quran;18 racial discrimination has been justified by reference to scripture of the Latter-Day Saints;19 and despising disabled people justified by reference to scripture of Hinduism.20 Turning to the highest profile contemporary issue, on sexual orientation many Jews and Christians would treat as scripture Leviticus, which states 'Thou shalt not lie down with mankind as with womankind; it is an abomination'.21
The status of this scripture will vary enormously even within those communities which see it as an authentic part of their religious world-view. So self-identifying Christians will give varying weight to, for instance, the Old Testament, the New Testament, the teachings of the Catholic Church, the prophetic insights of the President of the Church of Jesus-Christ of the Latter Day saints, and the conscience of the individual. Similarly, the origins of the scripture will vary enormously across different religions. The largest world-religions have significant bodies of scripture which have been generated in the distant past, but others have generated their bodies of scripture within living memory. Particularly in the case of the older bodies of scripture, however, interpretation of the scriptures has been a substantial intellectual project, in some cases one taking place over millennia. This project will, on occasions, generate an understanding of the body of scripture which may differ considerably from that of an outsider exposed to the bare words of the text for the first time.22
These factors run counter to a monolithic view of particular religious people, religions, or families of religions. The examples above are intended to illustrate the resources available to those within or without the community which, on a bare reading of the text, may be apt to show that the religion is hateful. It should be stressed, however, that these examples should not be taken as indicating that every person who self-identifies as a member of the religious group in question would condemn in the terms outlined. There are, for instance, self-identifying Christians who do not see any distinction between homosexual and heterosexual relationships, 18 Nonetheless, it is clear that there is real potential for preaching of scriptures revered by significant communities in the UK to constitute condemnation of groups, and practices by members of those groups, protected by comparative recent developments in equality law. One thread of equality law is the protection of groups sharing a protected characteristic from hate speech and hate crime. The next section considers the development of this area of law.
III.
Introducing hate speech and hate crime committed by speech.
Hatred law in England and Wales has two main branches: hate crime, and hate speech.
A hate crime is a crime aggravated by the existence of a proscribed type of hostility. Some crimes can be committed by speech alone, and in those cases the speech crime may constitute a hate crime. Thus hate crime blurs easily into hate speech. The distinctive feature of hate speech is communication apt to create hatred in the minds of others in relation to a prohibited ground.
In purely numerical terms, prosecutions and convictions for hate speech offences are very much less common than hate crimes.25
Before 2001 only hostility on the grounds of race could form the basis of a hate crime.
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereafter CDA 1998), took two distinct routes to increase the punishment of racial hate crime.26 It created substantive hate crimes which required racial aggravation of a particular basic offence and carried substantially higher maximum sentences. Incitement to racial hatred can be committed by merely insulting or abusive words or behaviour, while incitement to religious hatred cannot. Incitement to racial hatred can be committed intentionally or recklessly, while incitement to religious hatred can only be committed intentionally. Additionally, the religious incitement provision has a special saving clause in s.29J which provides that nothing in Part IIIA prohibits or restricts:
'discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs of practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system'.
IV.
Oppositional religious speech, scriptural citation, and hate law.
Applying hate law to oppositional religious speech based upon scriptural citation brings out potential problems: some of which may be capable of being resolved by particular interpretations of the current law, some of which are not.
(1) Criminal prosecution for citation of scripture.
In Kirk Session of Sandown Free Presbyterian Church,46 the Kirk Session had placed a newspaper advert condemning homosexual acts, making use of Biblical quotations. The ASA initially upheld complaints that the advert was homophobic and had caused serious offence.
The independent reviewer noted that the advert used 'selective quotations from the Bible', noting particularly the omission of the call for execution in Leviticus 20:13. He also thought that 'it was reasonable for the Council to consider that codes of conduct and sanctions laid down in biblical works from several millennia ago cannot be communicated verbatim and indiscriminately in twenty first century advertising'. The stirring up hatred provisions would not apply. The provisions on stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation have demanding mens rea and actus reus requirements.49
Reinforcing this view is the specific statutory provision which states that 'for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or the urging of persons to refrain from or to modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening'.50 The exclusion of this scenario from hate crime is, however, much less obvious. If the citation of the scripture was in circumstances which rendered it a criminal offence, most likely as a public order offence, then the words of the scripture could be read as a demonstration of hostility towards the protected group. Hate crime, in sharp contrast to hate speech, does not require that hostility actually exists, discussed more fully below, nor does it provide the statutory saving for criticism of sexual conduct or practices found in hate speech law.
As well as being cited, scripture has a physical existence. In Kirk Session, the speakers omitted a scriptural call for execution contained in the Bible. Is it a crime to possess a scripture containing such a call? the law criminalises possessing written material or audio-visual recordings which are threatening, which the person holds with a view to distribution or publication, and which the person intends to use to stir up hatred.51 A similar offence was later added for stirring up religious hatred,52 and stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. The later additions are, however, subject to the specific saving clauses which protect criticism of practice, quoted above. Calls for the death of those who carry out particular sexual practices would seem to go well beyond the type of speech envisaged by the statutory savings, however, and could easily constitute threatening materials: the key issue will then be the mens rea of the person possessing the scripture.
(2) Misconstruing hostility towards a protected characteristic.
A growing concern in the UK is the relative lack of religious literacy in a complex, (4) State involvement in intra-communal disputes.
Oppositional religious speech can be a communal good generated by disputes within a religious community.62 Additionally, there is a strong theme in court decisions on the importance of the autonomy of religious organisations which suggests that the state should be particularly cautious to intervene in a doctrinal dispute within a religious community.
The courts have found that hostility towards an individual on the basis of their membership of a group can occur even where the defendant is also a member of that group. 63 One positive feature of this approach is that complex issues of religious identity, for instance whether Protestants and Catholics share a religion, 64 do not need to be resolved in order to apply hate law to a scenario.
The inclusion of intra-group interaction may fairly be seen as a recognition of the ongoing, intimate, nature of some hate crime offending.65 In relation to intra-religious conflict, however, it could lead to the state punishing conflict within a religious group more seriously than other conflict. In this scenario, the state is not acting to protect members of the group from outsiders, but instead from one another. This raises significant issues concerning the autonomy of religious communities to determine their internal values and structures free of state control.
V. Ways forward?
The previous sections raised concerns around two important elements of religious liberty: the right to manifest religious belief, and the right to autonomy of religious organisations and communities. We should consider ways to minimise the burden on the religious preacher and their community while giving proper weight to the importance of hate law. An emphasis on religious rights can justify departing from balances of proportionality struck for freedom of expression alone, and directs attention to specific features of the preaching moment which are relevant to proportionality. There are five features that a court should be mindful of in this proportionality exercise.
Firstly, the significance of the exercise of religious rights by the preacher needs to be recognised. The general cases on mixed motives,66 would suggest that an intention to manifest religion is irrelevant if it can be shown that there is any element of the prohibited mental element or, for hate crime, a demonstration of hostility even in the absence of actual hostility. To give proper weight to freedom of religion, however, the courts should be prepared to depart from this and to accept that the required hostility or intent to stir up hatred can be entirely displaced by the intention to manifest religion; and that what is prime facie a demonstration of hostility can best be understood as a manifestation of religion. The context in which a statement is made, which can include for instance being 'the wider context and circumstance of him delivering a sermon wherein he was trying to communicate strong and robust beliefs that the God in which he believed was the only true God and that the worship of any other god was idolatrous',67 is crucial to understanding whether hate law applies. In particular, the courts need to be sensitive to the context when deciding whether a particular manifestation of religion constituted a demonstration of hostility under hate crime law. Sensitivity is also needed around desacralized language.
Secondly, one of the specific concerns raised above was the application of hate law to internal conflicts and debates within a religious community. If, as I have suggested above, it is possible to understand a transaction as turning not on prohibited hostility but on an intent to manifest religion or belief, it is at least as easy to understand intra-group hostility as based on personal animus, or personal conduct, to the exclusion of the shared group identity.
Emphasising, once again, the distinctive place of freedom of religion, it would be possible for the courts to depart from this line, and to favour an approach where, for intra-religious 66 e.g. offending, the natural finding of fact in most cases would be to exclude the transaction from the reach of hate law.
Thirdly, some religious people who use Biblical texts to condemn same-sex activity distinguish strongly between condemning a person, and condemning their actions. One way of putting this is to talk of hating sin, but loving sinners. It may be easier to justify the condemned sharing the cost of condemnation when it is possible for them to respond to the condemnation. This is not necessarily because they are to be held at fault, so that they have a duty to change.
Rather, it is because the public good of being condemned is something which it is comparatively easy for them to take advantage of. A smoker who is convinced by the condemnation that they are at fault can take advantage of this by ceasing to be a smoker. It is notably less easy for a person who becomes convinced that they should not be a man, or homosexually orientated, to take advantage of a condemnation of either of those characteristics. This absence of a benefit to the target of the criticism should be taken into account in gauging proportionality.
Fourthly, the court should not take account of the religious methodology of a user of scripture. It is tempting to treat scriptural citation as an exercise of scientific judgment. Taking this approach a speaker who makes fair use of their sources may be able to rely upon their reporting of these sources; while one who distorts the sources by unfair use may not. This approach would entangle the state in determining the true reading, or range of true readings, of religious texts -a function it is not well placed to carry out.
Finally, the court needs to be aware that the citation of scripture is a contemporary moment, regardless of the antiquity of the source used. The court needs to keep a focus on the actions and motivation of the human being making use of the sources, and may find it useful to consider the extent to which the speaker owns the scripture. This focus on ownership has an important implication for the discussion on materials in section III above. An individual must take ownership of the condemnatory words to be held to account for them. In the examples in section II, the particularly condemnatory words form part of a considerable corpus of sacred
texts. An individual may distribute this corpus without necessarily owning every part of it, even if in principle they would assert that they do. This emphasis on ownership would not be a complete innovation in religious hate law -for the offence of presenting a play intended to stir up religious hatred, an actor is only liable if they make the hateful performance their own by ignoring direction. 68 Even if the courts were prepared to take the principles outlined in this section and apply them as fully as possible to preachers faced with prosecutions under hate law, the current statutory framework is itself problematic. Stirring up hatred offences have particular protection for oppositional speech, in relation to the specific saving clauses for religion and sexual orientation. There is an argument, made particularly pressing by the position of the ethnoreligions, for considering whether inciting hatred against racial practices should have similar savings to those for religious and sexual orientation practices. There is also an argument for considering whether speech which would fall within a saving clause in relation to hate speech should be excluded from the context which may be used to find a hate crime. Such reforms are likely to be very contentious, particularly if they are understood as protecting oppositional religious speech against the application of state values. The key here is that the conflict between oppositional religious speech and state values is only on the surface. Recognition of the special status of religion or belief in the life of our fellow citizens, and in appropriate circumstances accommodation of their religious interests, is a fundamental state value in the UK.
